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Abstract 
 
This paper seeks to advance current understanding of uneven convergence in the 
context of EU environmental policy, and specifically, the Eco-Management and Audit 
Scheme (EMAS). Using a large sample, quantitative methodology, we examine three 
broad sets of determinants hypothesised to influence geographic patterns of policy 
convergence: (1) cross-national market integration; (2) compatibility between the 
domestic regulatory context and European policy requirements; and (3) bottom-up 
pressure from market and societal actors. Our analysis provides empirical support for 
all three hypothesised determinants. We find that measures of import-export ties, 
regulatory burden, past policy adoptions, environmental demand from civil society and 
levels of economic productivity, are all statistically significant predictors of national 
EMAS counts. Against a backdrop of geographically diverse regulatory institutions, 
societal conditions and trading relationships, we conclude that unevenness is an 
inevitable feature of Europeanisation. 
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Despite strong top-down pressures from the European Union (EU), few accept the idea 
that member states are converging, or indeed will converge, to a single “European” 
model of administrative structure, practice or policy. Instead, as is well-documented, 
the outcomes of Europeanisation have proved far more complex, characterised by 
elements of convergence, divergence and persistent national diversity (Cornelisse and 
Goudswaard, 2002; Jordan et al, 2003; Marginson and Sisson, 2002; Weale et al, 
2000). This paper attempts to explain these geographically uneven patterns of 
convergence and non-convergence in the context of European Union (EU) 
environmental policy, and specifically, the Eco-Management and Audit Scheme 
(EMAS). 
  EMAS is a voluntary scheme that seeks to assist firms
1 in evaluating, reporting 
and improving their environmental performance (Honkasalo, 1998). By offering 
flexibility and various market-based benefits, the European Commission hoped that 
EMAS would be readily adopted by firms across the EU. Yet this has not happened. 
Uptake of the standard has been highly uneven. While EMAS has proved popular 
amongst firms in several member states (e.g., Germany), adoption has been far lower in 
others (e.g., Portugal).  
  What explains these geographically uneven patterns of policy adoption? The 
existing empirical and theoretical literature on policy diffusion, convergence and 
Europeanisation identifies three broad sets of determinants that might account for 
empirically observable patterns of convergence and non-convergence across the EU 
(Bennett, 1991; Drezner, 2001; Knill, 2001; Potoski and Prakash, 2004; Tews et al, 
                                                 
1 The term “firm” is used broadly here to denote all private and public sector entities capable of 
registering to EMAS. 
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(2) “goodness-of-fit” between the domestic regulatory context and European policy 
requirements; and (3) “domestic mobilisation” (Börzel, 2003) by market and societal 
actors. Previous empirical studies have predominantly concentrated on the second of 
these determinants, focusing, in particular, on instances of non-convergence arising 
from “misfitting” EU policy (Bailey, 2002; Olsen and Peters, 1996; Szarka, 2003). By 
contrast, far less work exists on either of the other two determinants, and especially 
market integration. The result is that considerably more is known about the factors that 
impede convergence than those which drive or support it. 
Responding to these shortcomings, this paper investigates the role of all three 
hypothesised determinants in explaining cross-national variations in the adoption of EU 
environmental policy. To do so, we use a quantitative methodology to analyse cross-
national variations in EMAS registrations, based on a sample that includes 15 EU 
member states
2, that is novel to the literature in this field. Inevitably, our large-sample, 
econometric approach is constrained by the availability of measurable proxies and, 
moreover, cannot provide the kind of contextual detail afforded by previous small-
sample, qualitative studies. However, our quantitative methodology is well-suited to 
identifying the generic determinants of adoption, and hence confirming or rejecting 
theoretical predictions about the causes of uneven policy convergence across the EU. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 details the origins and nature of 
EMAS. Section 3 develops our hypotheses, Section 4 outlines the data, measures and 
methods used in the study, and results follow in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 provides 
discussion and conclusions. 
 
                                                 
2 The EU 15 prior to the accession of 10 new member states in May 2004 
4 
This version: August 2004  
2  EMAS: a new approach to regulating environmental behaviour 
Since the launch of its First Environmental Action Programme in 1973, the bulk of EU 
environment policy has comprised mandatory (“command-and-control”) regulations 
prescribing uniform, legally-binding standards for environmental performance and/or 
procedures. Over the past decade, however, the EU has experimented with a number of 
so-called “new environmental policy instruments” (NEPIs). Setting the agenda for this 
revised approach, the Commission’s Fifth Action Programme (1992-2000) recognised 
the limits to traditional mandatory regulation, and called for a broadening of EU 
environmental policy approaches. Thus, in addition to traditional top-down command-
and-control measures, it was suggested that the EU should adopt more bottom-up, 
partnership-oriented and market-based ones (Weale et al, 2000). 
  The EU’s Eco-Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS) was a product of this 
thinking. Launched following the early success of ISO 9000, the series of quality 
management standards developed by the International Organization for Standardization 
(ISO), EMAS was heralded as a new model of industrial environmental regulation, in 
that participation is voluntary. Furthermore, EMAS does not impose substantive 
“performance” requirements on firms; official registration to the scheme is conditional 
on participating organisations following set “procedures” intended to promote continual 
improvements in environmental performance. 
These procedures are: (1) the adoption of an environmental policy; (2) a 
comprehensive review of environmental issues, impacts and performance associated 
with the firm’s activities; (3) the introduction of an environmental management system 
(EMS) to co-ordinate and control the various environment-related tasks in the 
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meeting the firm’s environmental policy; and (5) the preparation of a public 
environmental statement which, inter alia, specifies the outcome of the organisation’s 
environmental programme and the extent to which this meets its policy objectives 
(Kahlenborn and Dal Maso, 2001). 
Two additional steps are required in order to receive EMAS registration. The 
firm must first commission an independent EMAS verifier to confirm that the 
environmental review, EMS, audit procedure and environmental statement have been 
correctly undertaken. The validated environmental statement must thereafter be sent to 
the national body responsible for registration. 
Although voluntary, in the sense that firms can choose whether to participate, 
the EMAS legislation (Council Regulation 1836/93) requires individual member states 
to take various actions to support the scheme. They are obliged to establish an 
accreditation system for independent verifiers and appoint a certification body 
responsible for maintaining a record of registered sites. The EMAS regulation also calls 
on member states to promote participation in the scheme, particularly among small-
and-medium-sized enterprises, through incentives ranging from information provision 
to financial assistance for applicants to the scheme (Glachant et al, 2002; Gouldson and 
Murphy, 1998; Honkasalo, 1998).  
EMAS is not the only standardised EMS standard. ISO 14001, the international 
voluntary code developed by the ISO, has been available to European firms since 1996. 
In common with EMAS, the ISO standard requires participating organisations to 
produce an environmental policy, implement an EMS and carry out periodic internal 
audits. However, ISO 14001 does not require compliance with statutory environmental 
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compliance in their environmental policy. Additionally, disclosure of performance 
information is discretionary for ISO 14001 certified facilities, whereas EMAS 
registered ones must produce a public environmental statement detailing their 
environmental impacts. Finally, certification to ISO 14001 is left in the hands of firms 
themselves, who have the choice to self-certify or seek third-party accreditation.  
For these reasons, ISO 14001 is less rigorous and demanding on firms than 
EMAS, and consequently, has proved more popular. As shown in Table 1, the number 
of ISO 14001 certifications across the 15 EU member states is over four times greater 
than the EMAS total. In fact, ISO certifications far outnumber EMAS registrations in 
all but two member states, Austria and Germany. Moreover, take-up of EMAS is also 
more unevenly distributed, with the bulk of EMAS registrations accounted for by a 
single country, Germany. Even after deflating EMAS counts by population size, 
considerable variations remain. Four countries, Austria, Germany, Sweden and 
Denmark, emerge as clear frontrunners in EMAS adoption, with participation rates 
ranging from 23.84 to 44.52 registrations per million inhabitants. Finland (6.94) and 
Spain (4.01), although lagging far behind the leading four, also have comparatively 
high per capita counts. The remaining nine member states all have participation rates 
below 2.5 registrations per million. The UK, for example, has 1.29, Greece 0.66, and 
France a mere 0.59 registrations per million inhabitants. 
 
< Insert Table 1 about here > 
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important questions about the uneven geography of Europeanisation. Why have firms 
in some countries proved more receptive to the EU standard than others? Are there 
specific geographic factors that have supported the adoption and diffusion of EMAS 
and, hence, convergence? Conversely, are there factors that have discouraged take-up 
of the standard, and therefore acted as a source of resistance to the homogenising 
pressures of the EU? The present paper addresses these questions, but before doing so, 
we explain our theoretically-derived hypotheses.   
 
 
3  Explaining cross-national variations in EMAS 
Registration to EMAS is potentially a costly process for firms. Steger (2000, page 27), 
for example, reports that the costs of acquiring the standard generally lie in the range 
€50,000-100,000. As a voluntary scheme, therefore, we expect participation to depend 
on the existence of offsetting benefits. Previous studies have defined these benefits in 
largely monetary terms (Glachant et al, 2002; Khanna and Anton, 2002). Arguing that 
managers are self-interested and rational agents, it is assumed that firms will only adopt 
an EMS where the financial benefits exceed the financial costs. 
We agree that the costs, benefits and profitability of EMAS are major factors 
shaping firms’ decisions to implement and register to the standard. Yet they are 
unlikely to be the only ones. Recent work in economic sociology suggests that firms 
often adopt organisational innovations for reasons that have little to do with enhancing 
efficiency or profitability. Rather, adoption may be triggered by managers’ quest for 
external legitimacy, and specifically, the need to conform to widely held beliefs of 
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1977). These dynamics are said to account for the fad-like spread of management 
practices which are unprofitable, or whose benefits are questionable.  
Our conceptual approach therefore recognises that participation in EMAS is 
likely to be shaped by two sets of factors. The first are geographic factors influencing 
the financial costs, benefits and profitability of the scheme, or indeed, the supply of 
information about these. The second, meanwhile, are ideational forces, and notably, the 
requirements of external stakeholders – suppliers, peers, etc – who define EMAS as a 
model of organisational “best practice.” Indeed, given the ambiguous cost-benefit ratio 
of EMS standards (Steger, 2000), we expect institutionalised forces to play an 
especially important role in the decision to adopt EMAS (Delmas, 2002; DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983; Guler et al, 2002; Kollman and Prakash, 2002). 
Drawing from the recent literature on policy diffusion, convergence and 
Europeanisation (Bennett, 1991; Börzel, 2003; Drezner, 2001; Knill, 2001; Potoski and 
Prakash, 2004; Tews et al, 2003), the following sub-sections detail three sets of factors 
that, directly or indirectly, might influence economic and institutional incentives in 
relation to EMAS. They are: (1) the geography of intra-EU market integration; (2) 
“goodness-of-fit” between the domestic regulatory context and European policy 
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The notion that market integration drives policy convergence is a popular one. Indeed, 
it underpins arguments, widely articulated in the academic and popular literature, that 
globalisation results in homogenisation (Drezner, 2001). One of the most important and 
long-standing forms of market integration is international trade. Environmentalists, 
together with many economists, have reasoned that increased trade leads to a regulatory 
“race to the bottom.” Governments, regulators and firms, faced with intensified market 
competition, will seek to minimise compliance costs by opting for the lowest 
environmental standard (Clapp, 2001). Other analysts have challenged this logic, 
however, arguing that increased economic interdependence may result in the 
strengthening of environmental regulations. Vogel (1997), for example, highlights the 
possibility of “trading-up”, as high environmental standards in one country compel 
firms in another to adopt the same standards in order to build and/or maintain export 
share. 
Applying these revisionist arguments to EMSs suggests that trade between 
countries may create positive incentives for “upwards” policy convergence. A growing 
number of firms, and especially large and/or multinational ones, are requiring their 
foreign suppliers to be certified to a standardised EMS as a condition of contracting. 
Moreover, consistent with the notion of “trading-up”, reports suggest that these 
requirements are generating pressures for the adoption of an EMS through regional 
and/or global supply chains (Bansal and Bogner, 2002; Morrow and Rondinelli, 2002; 
Steger et al, 2002). 
The practical implications of these requirements are likely to vary depending on 
a country’s trading partners (Kern et al, 2001; Marginson and Sisson, 2002; Tews et al, 
10 
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states with low numbers of EMAS registrations, firms may well opt for ISO 14001, 
since it is an internationally-recognised standard, accepted in markets across the globe 
(Glachant et al, 2002). By contrast, firms in countries that primarily export to member 
states with high levels of EMAS participation are more likely to register to the EU 
standard. EMAS is exclusively European, and therefore offers clear commercial 
advantage only to firms supplying EU member states, where EMAS is preferred over 
ISO 14001 (Delmas, 2002; Epstein and Roy, 1998; Steger, 2000). 
Another way in which market integration might drive policy convergence is 
through cross-national communication networks (Bennett, 1991; Kern et al, 2001; 
Tews et al, 2003). The importance of so-called “weak ties” (Granovetter, 1973), that is, 
linkages between heterogeneous communities, in the cross-national diffusion of 
organisational innovations is well-documented (Arias and Guillén, 1998). After Guler 
et al (2002), we expect interactions between buyers and suppliers in different countries 
to facilitate the transfer of information, knowledge and expertise about EMAS, 
reducing the search and implementation costs for potential adopters. Trade linkages 
also provide conduits for the dissemination of norms, rhetorics and professional 
expectations, defining EMAS as a model of “best practice.” Influenced by their trading 
partners, domestic managers may adopt EMAS in order to conform to institutionalised 
ideas and norms of rational management practice, and avoid the impression of 
backwardness (Drezner, 2001). 
Taken together, the above discussion indicates that market integration provides 
positive economic and institutional incentives for “upwards” convergence to EMAS. 
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linked via import and/or export ties to registered facilities in other member states. 
 
Hypothesis 1. States that are closely linked by trade to other member states with high 
levels of EMAS participation will themselves have a larger numbers of registrations. 
 
 
3.2  Domestic regulatory styles, traditions and experience 
Just as market integration has emerged as one of the most popular explanations for 
policy convergence so domestic regulatory institutions are frequently portrayed as a 
leading source of non-convergence (March and Olsen, 1979). Central to this thinking is 
the idea that each country possesses a unique set of policy styles, structures and 
experiences that define how different regulatory issues are approached and 
administered. An influential body of “institutionalist” work argues that domestic 
regulatory institutions are a key determinant of European policy usage (Jordan et al, 
2003; Knill and Lehmkuhl, 2002). According to these approaches, EU policy is most 
likely to be adopted and/or effectively implemented where it “fits”, in the sense of 
conforming to domestic systems of regulation. Conversely, “misfitting” polices which 
do not match pre-existing regulatory approaches are likely to be opposed, or simply 
ignored, resulting in low levels of take-up or implementation at the national level. 
Empirical studies generally confirm these predictions finding that the degree of fit has a 
significant influence on the acceptance or rejection of “downloaded” EU policy by 
member state governments, regulators and firms (Bailey, 2002; Knill and Lenschow, 
1998; Szarka, 2003). 
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of-fit in relation to EMAS, and hence geographic patterns of adoption, are traditions of 
regulatory interventionism. Two factors are important here. First, voluntary 
environmental policies are likely to fit better with less interventionist, “business-
friendly” styles of policy-making and implementation. With their emphasis on self-
regulation, flexibility and market-centeredness, voluntary policies are unlikely to be 
accepted by highly interventionist governments. Here, the incorporation of voluntary 
approaches such as EMAS will require changes to pre-existing regulatory 
arrangements, suggesting resistance or, at least, low levels of public support (Knill, 
2001; Wilson, 2002; Weale et al, 2000). Instead, voluntary approaches are far more 
likely to be accepted and incorporated in countries with less interventionist, market-
friendly regulatory styles and structures. Favouring voluntaristic, market-led 
approaches, we expect public regulators in these countries to look upon voluntary 
environmental policies positively, supporting their deployment with a range of 
incentives. 
These incentives are known to be of considerable importance in the decision to 
adopt EMAS. A number of detailed comparative studies have found that cross-country 
variations in the degree of regulatory relief (reduced reporting requirements, 
inspections, etc) or financial support (subsidies, etc) offered by public regulators 
explain much of the willingness of firms in several member to adopt EMAS compared 
with their counterparts in others (Delmas, 2002; Kollman and Prakash, 2001). These 
findings are not entirely surprising. The level of regulatory incentives significantly 
impacts the cost-benefit calculus of EMAS registration and hence the financial 
incentive for firms to adopt the standard (Glachant et al, 2002). 
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market-friendly regulatory approaches concerns firms themselves. Kollman and 
Prakash (2001, page 417) argue that past experience of stringent regulation ‘…make 
industry suspicious’ of government regulation. This, they argue, includes government-
sponsored voluntary environmental policy instruments whose uptake depends, to a 
greater or lesser extent, on the goodwill of industry and co-operative relations with 
public regulators (Delmas and Terlaak, 2002). These features are unlikely to be found 
in countries where firms have traditionally been subject to heavy-handed, burdensome 
and erratic regulatory interventions. Rather, we expect the capacity and willingness of 
firms to adopt government-sponsored voluntary initiatives will be greater in countries 
characterised by less stringent, more business-friendly approaches to regulation. 
 
Hypothesis 2. Countries with less interventionist, burdensome styles of business 
regulation are likely to have a higher number of EMAS registrations. 
 
  Another factor influencing compatibility is the legacy of policy usage. A 
common assumption of institutionalist approaches is that instrument choice is path-
dependent in that past policy adoptions shape future ones (Delmas, 2002; Kollman and 
Prakash, 2002; Szarka, 2003). Adoption of a policy is more likely, in other words, 
where it is already widely diffused. There are two reasons why we should expect path-
dependencies in the case of EMAS. First, past experience of the standard is likely to 
reduce the information and implementation costs for subsequent adopters, and therefore 
improve its economic viability. For example, where EMAS is already widely diffused, 
applicants may profit from well-developed support and consultancy services. 
14 
This version: August 2004A second reason for the existence of path-dependencies are “bandwagon 
effects” (Rosenkopf and Abrahamson, 1999) whereby adoption by some actors 
increases the pressure on others to adopt. Bandwagon effects may be the result of 
increased information about profitability and/or efficiency that comes with a larger user 
base. However, given the uncertain cost-benefit ratio of EMSs, many analysts point to 
the critical importance of emulative processes (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Guler et 
al, 2002; Mendel, 2002; Rosenkopf and Abrahamson, 1999). Here, adoption decisions 
are primarily driven by popularity of the standard, as opposed to its profitability or 
efficiency. These dynamics may be reinforced by market requirements as pressures on 
firms to adopt a particular standard grow with the number of EMAS compliant firms 
(Bansal and Bogner, 2002; Glachant et al, 2002). 
  An important consequence of bandwagon effects is that patterns of policy 
convergence are likely to be self-reinforcing. We therefore expect early adoption of 
EMAS to be amplified over time: 
 
Hypothesis 3. Countries with a high initial take-up of EMAS are likely to have a 
greater number of registrations in subsequent years. 
 
Taking this hypothesis further, one might conclude that member states with a 
high number of EMAS registrations are likely to have a low number of ISO 14001 
certifications, and vice versa. Both EMAS and ISO 14001 perform broadly similar 
functions, yet because of the advantages enjoyed by the EMS with the largest number 
of adopters in terms of compatibility, observability, etc (Rogers, 1995), a single 
standard is likely to dominate the market for certifications (Glachant et al, 2002). This 
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long-term market leadership often goes to the standard which gets ahead first (David, 
1985). In these situations, high rates of early adoption set in motion a “snowballing” 
effect wherein a larger number of users encourage others to adopt the standard, thereby 
reinforcing its market advantage. Through this process, a single standard becomes 
preferred over others, potentially “locking-out” competitors which do not benefit from 
a similarly large user base (Arthur, 1989; Foray, 1997).  
Assuming that EMAS and ISO 14001 are competing standards, therefore, we 
expect take-up of the EU standard to be influenced by the respective number of 
cumulative adoptions of ISO 14001.  
 
Hypothesis 4. Countries with a higher number of ISO 14001 certificates are likely to 
have a lower number of EMAS registrations. 
 
 
3.3  Domestic mobilisation 
The idea that incompatibility between EU policy requirements and the domestic 
regulatory context impedes adoption or implementation, and hence convergence, has 
been criticised as excessively deterministic (Knill, 2001). Critics, for example, point to 
policy “misfits” which have nevertheless been adopted and/or effectively implemented 
by member states. To explain these anomalies, scholars have focused their attention on 
“bottom-up” pressures from domestic actors. Where a specific EU policy provides new 
strategic opportunities and benefits, it is suggested that domestic actors may mobilise 
behind it, for instance, pressuring domestic policy-makers, regulators or regulated 
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2002). In this way, even misfitting EU policies may be effectively adopted and 
implemented by member states.  
  One of the most obvious sources of bottom-up pressure identified in the 
literature comes from civil society (Gouldson and Murphy, 1998; Kern et al, 2001; 
Weale et al, 2000). Over recent decades, firms have come under pressure from civil 
society groups to adhere to high levels of environmental performance. Traditionally 
firms could meet these requirements by complying with relevant statutory 
environmental laws and regulations. Increasingly, however, it is suggested that firms 
are required to go beyond the statutory minimum, and conform to norms of acceptable 
behaviour defined by civil society (Grolin, 1998).   
  One way for firms to meet these enhanced requirements is by implementing a 
voluntary EMS. Indeed, evidence suggests that “reputation”, “green image” and 
“response to stakeholders”, are amongst the leading motivations for implementing and 
certifying an EMS (Clausen et al, 2002; Steger, 2000). An important question in the 
present context is why firms should opt for EMAS over ISO 14001. The enhanced 
procedural requirements of EMAS, particularly in terms of formal documentation, 
suggest that profit-maximising firms will opt for the ISO standard. On the other hand, 
EMAS is a more environmentally rigorous standard than ISO 14001, and therefore, 
carries greater credibility with the public (Glachant et al, 2002; Honkasalo, 1998; 
Wilson, 2002). The provision of a public statement detailing environmental 
performance, in particular, sends ‘…a clear and positive signal to stakeholders 
concerning firms’ commitment to improvements in environmental performance’ 
17 
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society’s environmental expectations are high. 
 
Hypothesis 5. Countries with a higher level of environmental demand are likely to have 
a higher number of EMAS registrations. 
 
  While conventional wisdom maintains that firms will necessarily resist 
additional environmental regulations, there is growing recognition that, under certain 
conditions, they may actively mobilise behind them. According to Porter and van der 
Linde (1995), for example, higher levels of environmental performance can enhance 
firm-level competitiveness, providing an economic incentive to lobby for and/or 
voluntarily adopt more stringent standards. Cost-savings arising from increased energy 
and/or resource efficiency are one potential source of improved competitiveness. ‘A 
good EMS will…allow the firm to uncover ways in which the firm can reduce its 
environmental impacts while simultaneously reducing costs or increasing productivity’ 
(Bansal and Bogner, 2002, page 272). No doubt this economic driver explains why, 
alongside meeting stakeholder requirements, cost savings are recurrently cited as one of 
the most important motives for adopting an EMS standard (Bansal and Bogner, 2002; 
Corbett and Kirsch, 2000; Delmas, 2002; Morrow and Rondinelli, 2002). 
Yet the economic incentive to invest in EMSs on productivity grounds varies. 
Firms that already achieve high levels of productivity stand to gain little from an EMS 
in terms of efficiency since they will have exhausted many of the profitable 
investments in cost savings and process enhancements (Steger, 2000). By contrast, for 
firms characterised by low levels of productivity, an EMS can greatly assist in the 
18 
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2002). The return on investment for an EMS may be higher in these situations, 
increasing the economic incentive for adoption. Neumayer and Perkins (2004a, b) 
demonstrate this negative relationship between productivity levels and take-up for ISO 
14001 and ISO 9000 at the global level. Therefore, we expect: 
 
Hypothesis 6. Countries characterised by low levels of productivity are likely to have a 
larger number of EMAS registrations. 
 
 
4  Empirical analysis 
The dependent variable used in this study is the number of EMAS registered facilities 
per one million inhabitants (EMAS p.c.) as published by European Commission (2003). 
The data cover the period 1997-2001
3 although we omit the first year due to the use of 
the initial EMAS count as one of the independent variables (see below).   
Our full set of explanatory variables are as follows. In order to measure the 
influence of cross-national trade ties, we adapt Guler et al’s (2002) cohesion model 
used in their study into the global spread of ISO 9000. We measure the trade cohesion 
effect using the following formula: 
 
Trade cohesion effect of country i in year t = ∑j EMASjt · (Tradeijt/Tradeit) 
 
                                                 
3 Changes to the scheme, whereby companies with multiple sites could apply for a single registration, 
mean that our analysis purposely excludes data from 2002 onwards. 
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and imports between country i and country j in year t and Tradeit is country i's total 
trade with other EU member states in year t. The trade cohesion effect is a non-negative 
number that rises with the number of EMAS registered sites in important trading 
partners. Thus, countries trading more with Germany than Italy, for example, will score 
higher on the trade cohesion variable. Trade data are taken from OECD (2003). 
As a proxy for the style of regulatory interventionism, we use a sub-component 
of the Index of Economic Freedom, published by Heritage Foundation (2003). The 
variable seeks to measure the regulatory burden imposed on private business 
(REGULATORYBURDEN) on a one-to-five scale. A country is rated one if existing 
regulations are applied uniformly, and where public regulatory interventions impose a 
comparatively light burden on business. At the other end of the scale, a rating of five is 
reserved for countries where regulations are applied unevenly, and high levels of 
regulatory interventionism by governments impede new business creation.  
Ideally, we would like to control for self-reinforcing diffusion dynamics with 
the help of a lagged dependent variable, since doing this would allow better 
identification of other determinants of EMAS registration. Yet our sample is too small 
and covers too few years to do so. We therefore control for the fact that high initial 
take-up of EMAS is likely to result in an ever larger number of registrations in later 
years by including the number of EMAS certified facilities per capita in 1997 
(EMASINITIAL p.c.). To measure the impact of the competing ISO standard on EMAS 
registrations, we use the number of facilities certified to ISO 14001 in per capita terms 
(ISO14000 p.c.). ISO certification data are derived from ISO (2002) and population 
data from World Bank (2003). 
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take the percentage of people who said they trust environmental protection associations 
‘when it comes to environmental issues’ in the Eurobarometer 58.0 survey (TRUST 
ENV. ORG.) (EORG, 2002).
4 Although we would have liked to use a question that 
directly asks about public support for such associations, no such question is contained 
in the survey. In its absence, we take trust as a proxy for support. Additionally, to 
measure environmental demand, we include per capita gross domestic product in 
thousand US$ (GDP p.c.). The use of this measure is consistent with economic theory, 
which predicts that demand for environmental quality is a normal good, in that demand 
rises with income. It also fits Inglehart’s (1990) proposition that the share of 
individuals with post-materialist values, including concern for the environment, rises in 
more economically advanced societies. Data in purchasing power parity (PPP) are 
taken from World Bank (2003) and converted to constant prices for 1996 in US$. 
Again using World Bank (2003) data, we estimate the impact of domestic productivity 
levels on registration activity by dividing GDP in PPP by the size of the labour force, 
yielding a measure of product per worker in thousand US$ (GDP per worker). Table 2 
provides summary descriptive variable information. Table 3 details the respective mean 
values of dependent and independent variables over the study period. 
 
< Insert Tables 2 and 3 about here > 
 
We estimate the following model: 
 
                                                 
4 Note, although this variable refers to the late-1990s and is time-invariant, the level of demand is 
unlikely to have changed much over the study period. 
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The subscript i represents each country in year t, y is the number of EMAS 
certifications per capita and x is the vector of explanatory variables. The year-specific 
dummy variables T capture general developments such as the Europe-wide spread of 
awareness about the standard. The vit is a stochastic error term. We estimate equation 
(1) with Beck and Katz’s (1995) commonly applied time-series cross-sectional 
estimator with panel-corrected standard errors. The error term is presumed to be 
heteroskedastic and contemporaneously correlated across panels. We tested the data for 
serial correlation, for which we found evidence, such that the error term is presumed to 
be subject to a common autoregressive error of order one. 
 
  < Insert Table 4 about here > 
 
5  Results 
Table 4, column 1 reports our estimation results. Trade linkages with countries that 
have a higher number of EMAS registrations exert a positive influence on up-take of 
the standard. A member state is more likely to have a high number of EMAS 
registrations, in other words, where it trades extensively with other states which 
themselves have a high per capita EMAS count. Our econometric estimations, of 
course, say nothing about the mechanisms through which trading relationships might 
influence registration activity. Yet our findings are consistent with recent theoretical 
work suggesting that such linkages act as conduits for the transfer of coercive 
pressures, information and norms of “best practice”, compelling, inducing or 
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1998). 
Consistent with a priori expectations, our variable measuring the regulatory 
burden imposed on private business is statistically significant, with the expected 
negative coefficient sign. Again, our estimations do not allow us to draw inferences 
about the underlying determinants of this relationship, although the result is intuitively 
plausible. With its emphasis on self-regulation, flexibility and market-centeredness, 
EMAS is likely to fit better with less interventionist, business-friendly policy-making 
and implementation styles (Knill, 2001).  
The initial number of EMAS registrations has a positive and highly statistically 
significant impact on registration counts in subsequent years. This result is consistent 
with theoretical predictions concerning increasing returns to adoption, bandwagon 
dynamics and path-dependency. Of particular note, the positive coefficient for 
EMASINITIAL p.c. strongly suggests that geographic patterns of convergence are self-
reinforcing, with initial differences in member states’ receptiveness to new policy 
initiatives amplified over time. Contrary to expectations, however, we do not find that a 
higher number of ISO 14001 certificates is associated with a lower number of EMAS 
registrations. The estimated ISO14000 p.c variable is statistically significant with a 
positive coefficient sign. This contradicts theoretical models of “lock-in” which predict 
that a single standard will come to dominate the market for EMSs (David, 1985). Yet 
our results may simply reflect two special characteristics of current EMS standards. 
First, the procedural differences between EMAS and ISO 14001 are comparatively 
small (Steger, 2000). Indeed, it is relatively straightforward for facilities certified to the 
ISO standard to go on to register for EMAS, and vice versa (Glachant et al, 2002). 
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number of large European firms have adopted both EMAS and ISO 14001. 
As expected, both the TRUST ENV. ORG. and GDP p.c. variables are positive 
and statistically significant, indicating that a higher level of demand from civil society 
is associated with a larger number of EMAS registered sites. Most likely this reflects 
the greater pressure faced by firms to demonstrate high levels of environmental 
performance in states characterised by strong post-materialist values (Weale et al, 
2000).  Public regulators in these countries are also more likely to be willing to support 
the adoption of EMAS using a range of financial and regulatory incentives. Finally, we 
find that a higher GDP per worker is associated with a lower number of EMAS 
registrations, confirming predictions that EMS standards are more likely to be adopted 
where the productivity gains from adoption, and hence economic returns, are higher. 
 
< Insert Table 4 about here > 
 
Rho, the estimated autocorrelation parameter, is somewhat close to one, supporting 
our specification of the error term being subject to first-order autocorrelation. The 
explanatory power of the estimated model is quite high with an R-squared of almost 
.78. EMASINITIAL p.c. accounts for a large part of the explanatory power of the model.  
If we remove this variable from the model, the R-squared drops to .47 (see column 2 of 
Table 4). This is unsurprising given that we use the initial EMAS count in place of a 
lagged dependent variable. For the same reason, it is unsurprising that the value of rho 
now increases, since a lagged dependent variable (or, in its absence, a proxy variable 
for it) typically reduces autocorrelation of the error term. Estimation results for the 
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are hardly affected, with one exception: REGULATORYBURDEN becomes 
insignificant. This finding makes sense since neither Germany nor Austria, the two 
countries with the highest per capita EMAS counts, have a particularly low regulatory 
burden. A low regulatory burden can promote EMAS uptake, therefore, but the 




6  Discussion and conclusions 
Despite strong top-down, integrationist pressures, the outcomes of Europeanisation 
remain geographically uneven. In this paper we seek to advance current understanding 
of uneven convergence in the context of EU environmental policy. To this end, we 
investigate the determinants of cross-national variations in EMAS, a voluntary EMS 
developed and promoted by the EU. Our study is unique within the relevant literature in 
that we take a large sample, quantitative approach to understand patterns of 
Europeanisation. This allows us better to identify causal relationships across member 
states and, in doing so, draw more widely applicable conclusions than previous small 
sample, qualitative work. 
Existing research into the uneven adoption or implementation of EU policy at 
the domestic level has predominantly focused on the winnowing effect of regulatory 
styles, structures and traditions (Bailey, 2002; Liefferink and Jordan, 2002; Olsen and 
Peters, 1996; Szarka, 2003). This body of work has identified a major role for the 
domestic regulatory context in supporting and/or impeding European policy 
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regulatory environments are more compatible with EMAS than others, therefore, we 
find that EMAS registrations are higher in member states with less interventionist, 
burdensome styles of regulation. We also find that past and/or accumulated policy 
experience influences adoption patterns. The initial number of EMAS registrations and 
ISO 14001 certification counts are positively correlated with EMAS registration 
activity. This is consistent with the idea that certain countries develop a “management 
system culture” (Delmas, 2002; Knill, 2001) that facilitates acceptance and diffusion of 
EMS standards.  
At the same time, however, our analysis suggests that the degree of 
compatibility (“goodness-of-fit”) between EU policy and the domestic regulatory 
context provides at best only a partial explanation for uneven policy convergence. 
Other geographic factors are also important. One is the level of bottom-up support from 
domestic actors, that is, “domestic mobilisation.” Our findings provide empirical 
support for the idea of civil society “pulling down” (Börzel, 2003) European policy to 
the domestic level. According to our estimations, the level of environmental demand 
from civil society positively influences EMAS registrations, presumably reflecting 
enhanced pressures on firms (and regulators) to support more stringent policy. 
Additionally, our results corroborate the claim that firms may mobilise behind a new 
EU policy if it provides an opportunity to enhance competitive advantage (Knill, 2001; 
Weale et al, 2000). Take-up of EMAS is greater in countries with lower levels of 
economic productivity where, intuitively, we expect the financial returns to adoption 
are greater. 
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that uneven patterns of adoption reflect differences in the degree to which individual 
member states are linked to each other through trade (Marginson and Sisson, 2002; 
Vogel, 1997). The number of domestic EMAS registrations is found to be directly 
related to the popularity of the standard in member states with which a country shares 
strong import-export ties. Previous work, based exclusively on case-study evidence 
from a handful of member states, has struggled to provide convincing empirical support 
for these linkages (see Steger et al, 2002). Our analysis uniquely provides robust 
evidence for trade as a conduit of policy diffusion across the EU based on a sample that 
includes 15 member states.   
Several caveats, of course, accompany these findings. EMAS is only one 
example of European policy and, moreover, a policy instrument with some peculiar 
characteristics. Unlike the majority of EU environmental policy, EMAS is voluntary, 
meaning that adoption decisions are taken directly by firms. Precisely for this reason, 
we expect geographic factors influencing acceptance or rejection of the standard to 
differ, albeit more in degree than in kind, from conventional regulatory instruments 
(Tews et al, 2003). Another important qualification is that our empirical analysis only 
focuses on the adoption of EMAS. It says nothing about cross-national differences in 
the practical implementation  of the standard. This is significant. Previous research 
shows that formal incorporation of EU policy by member states rarely implies 
homogeneity in patterns of implementation (Bailey, 2002; Liefferink and Jordan, 
2002). Indeed, convergence in policy content may be accompanied by divergence in 
implementation approaches. The results of our work therefore shed light only on one 
aspect of policy convergence. A major task for future research is to investigate the 
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conventional and new environmental instruments. 
Our study nevertheless provides two valuable lessons. First, it cautions against 
univariate explanations of uneven policy convergence across the EU. While 
theoretically elegant, the notion that the domestic regulatory context, in and by itself, 
determines patterns of adoption may be too simplistic. Consideration needs to be given 
to other social, economic and political factors, a point recognised in a number of recent 
studies, which have argued for more sophisticated, differentiated and multivariate 
explanations of uneven European policy adoption, implementation and convergence 
(Börzel, 2003; Kern et al, 2001; Knill, 2001). The second lesson from our work is the 
inevitability of unevenness in the Europeanisation process. Many of the factors we 
identify as supporting and/or impeding policy convergence exhibit, to a greater or 
lesser extent, a high degree of stability (Weale et al, 2000). Although the demand for 
environmental protection, regulatory styles, trade flows, and so on, change over time, 
experience suggests that they do so only very slowly. We therefore expect current 
patterns of uneven Europeanisation and weak policy convergence to continue long into 
the future.  
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Austria  362 44.52 223 27.42 1.62 
Belgium 14 1.36 130  12.62  0.11 
Denmark 170 31.72 919 171.49  0.18 
Finland 36  6.94  687  132.42  0.05 
France   35  0.59  1092  18.45  0.03 
Germany 2662 32.35 3380 41.07 0.79 
Greece 7  0.66  66  6.23  0.11 
Ireland 8  2.08  247  64.34  0.03 
Italy 74  1.28  1295  22.37  0.06 
Luxembourg 1  2.27  9  20.41  0.11 
Netherlands 24  1.50  942  58.88  0.03 
Portugal 2 0.20 88 8.80  0.02 
Spain 165  4.01  2064  50.22  0.08 
Sweden 212  23.84  2070  232.74  0.10 
UK 76  1.29  2722  46.29  0.03 
EU  15  3848  10.18 15934 42.15  0.24 
 
Sources: Authors’ own calculations based on ISO (2002), European Commission 
(2003) and World Bank (2003). 
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Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev. Min  Max 
EMAS p.c.  60  7.81  11.40  0  44.52 
TRUST ENV. ASS.  60  47.33  8.55  30  66 
GDP p.c.  60  22.74  6.18  14.03 44.12 
TRADECOHESION 60  182.38 139.18  55.24 715.12
REGULATORYBURDEN 60  2.72  0.49  2  4 
EMASINITIAL p.c.  60  1.79  3.44  0  13.59 
ISO 14001 p.c.  60  36.96  45.92  0.95  232.74
GDP per worker  60  47.40  15.67  28.77 103.42
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Austria              30.42  47 23.15  617.21 3 4.34 22.02 49.46
Belgium               
                 
              
             
                 
            
            
         
                 
                 
               
           
              
1.05 44 22.84  120.50 3 0.20 9.91 54.95
Denmark 24.41 49 25.08 165.10 2 2.84 105.04 45.43
Finland 5.22 45 20.81  105.88 3 2.72 90.40 41.41
France 0.55  41 20.98  198.59 2.50 0.12 10.86 46.44
Germany 26.29 59 22.24 103.83 3.25 13.59 19.01 44.68
Greece 0.21  53 14.92  200.72 3 0 3.26 34.59
Ireland 1.79  44 22.09  116.12 2 0.54 40.95 52.34
Italy 0.66  55  21.49  175.54 3 0 9.44 48.26
Luxembourg 2.30 49 41.91 168.25 2 0 17.23 98.15
Netherlands 1.43 49 24.08 351.58 3 0.58 38.85 51.78
Portugal 0.08 30 15.39  135.31 3 0 4.45 30.39
Spain 2.07  41  17.65  78.82 3 0.03 20.85 30.03
Sweden 19.50  66 27.34 72.73 3 1.70 129.41 40.84
United Kingdom  1.18  38  21.17  125.45  2  0.26  32.67  42.33 
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 (1)  (2) 
TRUST ENV. ASS.  0.125  0.471 
 (3.75)**  (4.13)** 
GDP p.c.  1.389  1.377 
 (5.14)**  (3.20)** 
TRADECOHESION 0.041  0.046 
 (4.39)**  (3.43)** 
REGULATORYBURDEN -4.700  -3.430 
 (4.09)**  (1.32) 
EMASINITIAL p.c.  1.998   
 (6.07)**   
ISO 14001 p.c.  0.038  0.033 
 (3.40)**  (2.03)* 
GDP per worker  -0.626  -0.687 
 (5.05)**  (3.43)** 







Rho 0.688  0.864 
Number of observations  60  60 
Number of countries  15  15 
 
Notes: Dependent variable is EMAS p.c. Prais-Winsten regression with correlated 
panel-corrected standard errors and common autoregressive error of order one. 
Coefficients of year-specific time dummies not shown. Absolute z-statistics in 
parentheses.  * significant at .05 level  ** at .01 level. 
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